Is a global wealth tax inevitable ?
“The problem is not that people are taxed too little, the problem is that government spends too much.”
Ronald Reagan
Summary
Western governments are under severe financial pressure with budget deficits and the costs of borrowing spiralling. There are growing calls, from the political left for wealth taxes to be imposed on billionaires. Wealth taxes fail because of capital flight. Adopting lessons learned from the OECD’s global minimum corporate tax inequality economist, Gabriel Zucman has set out a blueprint for a global wealth tax of 2%, that will put an end to capital flight.
The prospect of a global wealth tax is unlikely during the Trump administration. However, the OECD, which appears to have adopted an overtly Euro-leftist political agenda, is likely to continue working on the mechanisms to put in place global wealth tax, albeit in a way that is aimed at not antagonising the current U.S. administration.
Zucman v Arnault
A public row has broken out between Bernard Arnault, CEO of France’s largest company LVMH and the ‘rock star’economist and wealth tax advocate Professor Gabriel Zucman. Arnault has accused Zucman of being a pseudo-academic and far-left activist whose wealth tax plans, if implemented, will wreck the French economy. Zucman claims that his work is based on research and accuses Arnault of having a Trumpian disdain for the academy, knowledge and research. I go into detail about Zucman’s global wealth tax blueprint later. However, here are the key points:
A globally coordinated 2% annual tax on the wealth of ~ 3,000 billionaires, which is estimated to raise $200-250 billion p.a.. If extended to centimillionaires (as is currently proposed) a further $100-140 billion p.a would be raised.
The annual 2% tax would be levied on both income and capital and would according, to Zucman translate, into an effective 33% income tax rate for high net worth individuals (HNW/HNWIs).
In order to properly assess HNW wealth there would need to be a country-by-country disclosure and exchange of information detailing the beneficial ownership of those who owning 1% or more of public and private company shares, amongst other things.
Zucman is not a mere academic, he along with Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Saez are very political. Take Zucman’s position on taxation for instance:
“…[tax] is critical to fund the public services - such as education, health care and public infrastructure - that are the engines of economic growth..”
In 2024, government expenditure in the Euro area was equivalent to 49.6% of GDP and government revenues accounted for 46.5% of GDP . With relatively large public sectors one would expect, applying Zucman's logic, that EU economies would be powering ahead, instead they are mired in sluggish economic growth. There are many headlines when it comes to the failure of European economies, taking just two: in 2024 there was not one EU company in the global top ten, by market capitalisation; and the EU’s share of the world export market has fallen by five percentage points in the period 2004 to 2024.
The reality is that Zucman, Piketty and Saez are ‘inequality scholars’ whose work is focused on the theory that wealth grows faster than economic output, thus concentrating capital and income in ever-fewer hands. Zucman's focus is on the redistribution of wealth not economic growth. This is of course a perfectly reasonable position for an academic to take. However, adopting Zucman's overtly political agenda, is for organisations like the OECD (of which more later) which is constitutionally obligated to foster economic growth, very risky.
Wealth taxes back on the agenda
According to polling 86% of French voters - many of whom it seems are transfixed by ‘Zucmania’ - are in favour of wealth taxes. Across Europe there are calls for wealth taxes whether in the pursuit of social and climate justice or because of the fiscal peril facing many governments. Taking as an example, the UK, where the left wing of the governing Labour Party has repeatedly called for wealth taxes, as a means of plugging the budget deficit and funding public services. In early 2025 Angela Rayner the former Deputy PM (until her own tax issues got the better of her) and voice of the Labour-left in Cabinet, was reported to be pushing the UK Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, to consider a wealth tax. Ahead of her keynote speech to the Labour Party conference in Liverpool, Reeves faced mounting calls for a wealth tax and was met by organised groups of demonstrators demanding that she “tax the super rich” and “pick a side”. Despite this pressure, for now at least, Reeves has said, somewhat equivocally, that she does not think the UK needs a standalone wealth tax. Fiscal reality may however change matters. In the past 20 years Britain's net public debt has climbed from 35% of GDP in 2005 to 95% today, and the UK budget deficit is forecast to reach £137 billion for 2024/2025. To add to the country's woes the 30-year bond yield recently hit a high of 5.747% its highest level since 1998. All of this means that interest payments alone on UK government borrowing are officially forecast to hit £111.2 billion in 2025-26, or some 8.3 per cent of total public spending. To put it another way 3.7 per cent of total national income goes on paying interest on government debt.
The appetite for wealth taxes is not confined to the European left or rock star economists at Parisian universities. During the 2024 US presidential election campaign, Kamala Harris endorsed President Biden’s proposal for a ‘Billionaire Minimum Income Tax’, which would have seen a 25% income tax imposed on those households with a net worth of more $100 million. Candidate Harris also proposed a tax on unrealised capital gains, something promoted by Harvard economist and former advisor to President Obama Jason Furman.
A history of failure
Perhaps one reason Reeves and others are reluctant to back a wealth tax is that they have been tried and failed before in Ireland, France, Holland and Sweden amongst others. The principal obstacle faced by wealth taxes is the fact that HNWIs can readily migrate to lower tax environments. It has been estimated that worldwide 142,000 millionaires will relocate to a new country in 2025. The UK government recently learnt this lesson when it changed the tax rules relating to domicile and residence, meaning that wealthy “non-doms” who had previously only had to pay tax on their UK earnings will now, after 4 years in the UK, have to pay tax on their worldwide income. Residence and citizenship planning firm Henley and Partners predict that that this change will result a net loss of approximately 16,500 millionaires to the UK in 2025, taking with them an estimated wealth of US$ 91.8 billion.
A global tax precedent and solutions to capital flight?
The GLoBE Rules (almost)
The key players in the adoption or otherwise of wealth taxes will be the G20 and the Paris based OECD. The OECD is particularly important as it was the key force behind the introduction of introduction of a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15% (the GLoBE Rules).
The OECD's campaign on this issue started in the last century when it promoted the narrative that tax competition between countries was harmful. In 1998 it set out its position as follows:
“…the effect is for one country to redirect capital and financial flows and the corresponding revenue from the other jurisdictions by bidding aggressively for the tax base... Some have described this effect as “poaching” as the tax base “rightly” belongs to the other country. ..Practices of this sort can appropriately be labelled harmful tax competition as they do not reflect different judgments about the appropriate level of taxes and public outlays…but are, in effect, tailored to attract investment or savings …or to facilitate the avoidance of other countries’ taxes…”
Connected to the concept of harmful tax competition and the implicit assumption that a tax base (and presumably taxpayers) belong to nations came the idea that tax competition between nations had led to a race to the bottom in terms of competing tax rates, that in turn eroded tax bases. This one of the OECD’s principal arguments in support of a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15% and went:
“…Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Model Rules, ensures that large multinational enterprises pay a minimum level of tax on their income in each jurisdiction where they operate, thereby reducing the incentive for profit shifting and placing a floor under tax competition, bringing an end to the race to the bottom on corporate tax rates…” (Link)
It is my view that in 2024 (before the Trump presidency was in full swing) Zucman's work was in large part predicated on what was seen as the success of the 2021 global minimum tax deal. Briefly, in 2021, over 136 countries agreed to the introduction of a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15%. The aim was - as articulated above - to remove the incentives for multinational enterprises, particularly American tech companies, to shift their profits to jurisdictions with no or very low taxation. That minimum tax rate would be enforced by the OECD's Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (GloBE Rules). However, the OECD's triumph soon turned sour when on his first day in office President Trump signed an executive order withdrawing from the deal stating;
“…The OECD Global Tax Deal supported under the prior administration not only allows extraterritorial jurisdiction over American income but also limits our Nation’s ability to enact tax policies that serve the interests of American businesses and workers…”.
The executive order led to furious headlines from the international press, Le Monde's being typical: "Donald Trump wrecks global minimum tax on multinationals".
The U.S. position was, in fact far more nuanced: the U.S. already had a minimum corporate tax. In 2017 the U.S. implemented the global intangible low-taxed income tax (GILTI). Under GILTI if a U.S. company uses a foreign low-tax jurisdiction to avoid paying U.S. taxes, it will be required to pay a minimum level of tax on its foreign earnings. GILTI allows U.S. companies do business anywhere in the world whether in high-tax or low-tax countries, provided that minimum rate of tax is paid on average. GILTI also provides U.S. companies with the opportunity to be charged an additional top-up tax to ensure the minimum is paid. GILTI was amended in July 2025 by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) and became the net CFC-tested income (NCTI) regime. Importantly, for the GLoBE Rules section 899 of the OBBBA contained provisions to treat foreign firms investing in the U.S. harshly, should extraterritorial or discriminatory taxes such as GLoBE, be applied against U.S. firms abroad. Those retaliatory measures were withdrawn once assurances were given that by the G7 that the extraterritorial undertaxed profits rule (UTPR), which would allow foreign jurisdictions to apply top up taxes on local entities of US parented firms to make up for low taxed profits elsewhere would not be enforced against US firms. At the moment options are being considered with the G7 on how the GLoBE Rules which are in effect across the EU and elsewhere and NCTI might work “side by side”. This despite there being very significant differences between the two regimes not least:
the NCTI allows US firms to offset low taxed income in jurisdictions against high taxed income in others. Whereas the GLoBE Rules require a minimum tax level in every jurisdiction; and
at 14% the US corporate tax rate is marginally lower than the global minimum.
So whilst the GLoBE Rules and the UTPR may well be in operation in the EU, how they will mesh with NCTI is as yet unclear. Perhaps more importantly, the original targets of those like the OECD who proposed a the global minimum corporate tax, namely the US tech giants have to a large extent been insulated from its effects. Perhaps this is why there have been reports of a Silicon Valley pivot toward President Trump.
Zucman’s global wealth tax blueprint
Background
In 2024 the Brazilian government led by veteran leftist Lula Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) took over the presidency of the G20. Following their meeting in Rio de Janeiro that same year, G20 Ministers issued a “Joint Ministerial Declaration on International Tax Cooperation” that set out their agreed position (all save Argentina) on tax and inequality:
“…Wealth and income inequalities are undermining economic growth and social cohesion and aggravating social vulnerabilities…Moreover, the international mobility of ultra-high-net-worth individuals creates challenges in ensuring adequate levels of taxation for this specific group, impacting tax progressivity…Promoting effective, fair, and progressive tax policies remains a significant challenge that international tax cooperation and targeted domestic reforms could help address…”
It is reported that Lula is obsessed with a billionaire wealth tax and to this end Zucman was commissioned to produce his “A Blueprint for a Coordinated Minimum Effective Taxation Standard for Ultra-High-Net-Worth Individuals” (the Blueprint).
It turns out that for all his academic credential Zucman had to rely on Forbes magazine as the source for the fundamental component of his Blueprint, namely the number of billionaires and their combined wealth. Zucman's relies on "data" from magazine that has gained notoriety for its “30 under 30 Curse” after eulogising fraudsters such as Sam Bankman-Fried, Elizabeth Holmes and Martin Shkreli. Zucman doubtless relied on Forbes because, there is a gap in the statistics as to the effective tax rates of HNWI and that this is an area of study in its infancy. This criticism may seem a little harsh. However, Zucman sets out a detailed economic prescription that, on any analysis, would be a major international undertaking with profound economic consequences, whether positive or negative.However it is worth bearing in mind that the perhaps the most famous of the Inequality Scholars, Thomas Piketty has similarly been criticised by fellow egalitarian economists Lawrence Blume and Steven Durlauf:
"...Both of us are very liberal (in the contemporary as opposed to classical sense), and we regard ourselves as egalitarians.We are therefore disturbed that Piketty has undermined the egalitarian case with weak empirical, analytical, and ethical arguments...”
Zucman’s claims
Central to Zucman’s Blueprint is his claim that HNWI are not effectively taxed. This is because HNWIs derive much less of their wealth from income (labour income/wages in particular) than do other social groups. As such income taxes fail to capture the true wealth of the HNWIs. Furthermore, a significant part of HNWI’s income is derived from capital income, realised capital gains for example, that are taxed at preferential rates compared to labour income. The result is that at a key benefit of income tax, namely its progressivity is lost (as are potential tax revenues) and it in fact becomes regressive.
How HNWIs avoid tax
The majority of HNWI's wealth is in the form what one could term: capital, assets or a stock of wealth. Principally HNWI capital is in the form of shareholdings in listed and private companies. This Zucman posits, facilitates and encourages forms of tax avoidance, in two ways:
The non-payment of dividends and retention of earnings within companies.
According to Zucman if an HNW directs a company not to pay dividends and instead retain or reinvest profits back into the business that is a form of tax avoidance. Zucman's reasoning goes that those profits are not locked away or frozen but instead increase the value of the company and as a consequence the wealth of its owners.
The use of holding companies
Zucman claims that by receiving dividends through holding companies individuals avoid income tax. This is not really explained by Zucman, but I assume he means something along the following lines: company dividends are paid out of post-tax profits, to holding companies located in jurisdictions with low or zero corporate tax rates that in turn declare dividends to be paid their shareholders, who themselves are in low-tax jurisdictions.
Defining wealth for Zucman’s tax purposes
Wealth is defined by Zucman as the market value of ones financial and non-financial assets net of debt. Zucman's wealth tax would be applicable only to those HNWIs that do not already pay income taxes equivalent to 2% of their wealth.
Whether a HNWI is liable to pay the 2% wealth tax or is considered to be exempt by virtue of the ratio of income taxes paid to overall wealth or not, HNWIs would need to declare the total value of their wealth in any event. However, as the Blueprint would require companies to disclose the beneficial owners of shareholdings of more than 1% much of that valuation process might be achieved independent of the HNWIs themselves.
Valuing wealth
HNWI wealth predominantly takes the form of shareholdings with about half in publicly listed companies the other half in unlisted private companies. The valuation of listed shareholdings is of course straightforward. Zucman suggest valuing private companies by various methods such as by reference to similarly sized listed companies (in the case of large private businesses); or using valuation multiples of market value to profits/sales/assets; or by making sales of shares in private companies reportable, thereby recording a form of market value.
As for those more personal aspects of wealth, such as art collections Zucman proposes using insurance valuations. This aspect of wealth valuation merits only a passing mention in the Blueprint which is somewhat surprising given the profound implications it has from a privacy perspective. There is also no mention of a threshold at which assets must be reported for valuation purposes or whether inherited assets on which tax might have already been paid, amongst a plethora of otherm as yet unforeseen consequences, of excessive state intrusion.
Wealth tax options
As for the application of three options that countries could adopt to comply with his global standard. In reality they are variations on a theme, namely:
Basic wealth tax
Simply put this would be a 2% tax on HNWI's net total wealth (total assets less total liabilities). This tax would be enforced, against fleeing HNWIs, by exit taxes and other taxpayer of last resort mechanisms. Although what the latter may be is not explained by Zucman.
Presumptive income tax
Under this approach it would be assumed that HNWI receive a proportion of their total wealth as income, whether they do or not, and they would be taxed on that presumed income in the ordinary way.
Adopt a broader definition of income
The definition of income for tax purposes could be widened to include capital income which would taxed at the same rate as labour income rather than at preferential tax rates. This option would presumably only work in practice if, it were applied to both realised and unrealised gains. This broadening of income is connected to a related strand of wealth tax thinking concerned with capital income, more generally. Capital income is generated by assets and not by labour. It is generally accepted that dividend income and capital gains - the most common form of capital income - are generally subject to lower effective tax rates than wage income. Traditionally, the reason given for lower capital income tax rates has been to encourage investment. OCED researchers have argued that the preferential treatment of capital income, predominantly benefits high income earners who earn a greater share of their income from capital. The researchers and concludes that this differential tax treatment can affect the efficiency and equity of tax systems. It is interesting to contrast the OECD’s focus on equity with that the UK’s Institute for Fiscal Studies analysis of capital gains tax rates which, although arguing for higher CGT rates, does so on the basis of a wider reform of capital income taxes, so as to encourage increasing owner-managers’ investment in their own businesses. The IFS’ approach is striking as it resembles the kind of thinking one would expect of the OECD, given its convention obligations in relation to economic growth.
Wealth reporting and cross-border information sharing
Zucman recommends extending the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) to HNWI. In brief CRS has two components:
The Standard, i.e. the information required from Financial Institutions about the identity of account holders.
Model Competent Authority Agreement, facilitating the exchange of information culled from financial institutions between tax authorities.
To date under CRS 108 Jurisdictions have exchanged information automatically using the OECD’s Common Transmission System, with 135 million financial accounts captured covering Euro 12 trillion in transactions. The extension of CRS to HNWIs would mean:
The inclusion of real estate and non-financial assets.
Extending the reporting requirements to shell companies with a focus on real estate holding companies.
Beneficial ownership information would be required from multinational companies.
New self-reporting requirements for HNWI to be modelled on the reports made by multinationals under the CRS.
Zucman's proposals are made in the context of the effective ending of bank secrecy under the CRS and similar provisions under the U.S’s, FATCA. Zucman effectively argues for total financial transparency in the case of HNWIs. The ramifications of this approach, were it to be adopted would be profound as they would effectively mark an end to financial privacy for the most powerful in society, something that would more than likely trickle down to the least powerful. If knowledge, as the saying goes is power, then perhaps it in reality means an attack on the very concept of private property itself.
Stopping capitalist flight: give reluctant nations a Hobson’s Choice
One of the key provisions that leading to the adoption of the GLoBE Rules was the undertaxed profits rule (UTPR). This means that a GLoBE Rules compliant country, that has adopted what are known as top-up taxes, can increase taxes on a company in its jurisdiction, if a related entity in another jurisdiction is being taxed below the 15% effective rate. If multiple countries have adopted top-up tax, the taxable profit is divided based on the location of tangible assets and employees. What this means is that countries with tax rates lower than 15% face a stark choice: increase the corporate tax rate (by way of top up taxes) to 15% or other countries will collect those revenues instead.
Zucman proposes translating the UTPR to HNWIs, as follows:
HNWIs in non-participating countries would be taxed on assets they own in participating countries. Assets would include both those directly owned by HNWI and those owned indirectly through corporations. In the latter scenario, suppose an HNWI in non-participating country owns shares in a multinational company, which in turn owns assets in a participating country. In this case the participating country would tax those assets in its territory to the extent that the minimum tax requires (or a relevant proportion therefore, if there are such assets across a number of participating jurisdictions).
A HNWI in a non-participating country with an interest in a firm with a nexus to a participating country would create a corresponding right of enforcement or tax liability for the local branch of that firm.
The role of the OECD (it's not about Zucman, really)
The OECD, perhaps best known as a supplier of authoritative economic statistics and forecast, was formed after World War Two to help the war torn economies rebuild. The OECD Convention, is admirably short and sets out the aims of the organisation in straightforward terms:
“…to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries …to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries; and…to contribute to the expansion of world trade…”
Today the OECD’s work and outlook resembles less an international technocratic facilitator of economic growth and more of a global NGO with particular agenda. A sample of OECD reports demonstrates the sheer breadth of the areas of life it looks at and a particular point of view or agenda it seems to have adopted:
Global Debt Report 2025
OECD Competition Trends 2025
The Carbon Footprint of Everything.
Enabling Trust in Food Labels for Improved Environmental Outcomes
Monitoring and Assessing the Impact of National Action Plans Against Racism
Towards a Renewable Hydrogen Strategy for Mongolia
EU Country Cancer Profile: Hungary 2025
The Economic Case for Greater LGBTI+ Equality in the United States
Promoting Active Ageing in Lithuania
The OECD and wealth tax
It is interesting to note that the OECDs Director of the Centre for Tax Policy and Administration between 2012 and 2022, Pascal Saint-Amans, the author of the “Paradis fiscaux: Comment on a changé le cours de l'histoire” (Tax Havens: How we changed the course of history) received, along with Piketty and Saez an acknowledgment from Zucman in the Blueprint. That agenda would become transparently clear in 2024, when Zucman's 2024 Blueprint the OECD in its "Secretary-General Tax Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors” claimed that it had an:
“…interest in addressing inequality [by] leveraging progressive tax policy…”
The OECD Secretary General then set out its stall on wealth and taxation, in very similar terms and at times using the same rhetoric as Zucman:
Tax policy is an important tool to reduce inequality across both income and wealth distributions.
The share of total wealth at the very top 0.001% has increased from 3.3% in 1995 6.9%.
HNWIs have comparatively low effective tax rates: 9.6% for 400 wealthiest in US. France and Holland, including for the following reasons:
More favourable tax rates for Capital Income, deferrals of CGT, narrow IHT bands, international mobility and tax planning are the principal reasons
HNWIs receive the largest share of Capital Income.
The taxation of Capital Income and Wealth significantly influences the progressivity of tax systems.
Most tax systems treat Capital Income more favourably than Labour income, thereby reducing horizontal and vertical equity.
Property and inheritance taxes are underutilised.
There should be a shift of focus to the taxation of capital income and wealth: and (perhaps unsurprisingly)
The OECD needs more resources and to do more work on the subject
By 2025 the Secretary General’s report adopted far less strident tone on its tax agenda and which by now included references, to growth a core concern for the OECD, previously overlooked in 2024:
“The [tax] workstream is motivated by growing questions regarding the contribution of tax policy to income gaps and sluggish economic growth. Tax policy can influence both, although the relationships are complex. In some instances, tax policies involve trade-offs between these objectives, while in others, they can achieve both goals simultaneously. The relationship between taxation, inequality, and growth is also highly context dependent, with optimal tax policy mixes varying based on factors such as a country’s economic conditions, stage of development, and policy priorities.”
Conclusion: is there something else going on?
I am not an economist, but it seems to me that Zucman’s views have some obvious flaws:
What stood out for me was the idea that by foregoing dividends and reinvesting in companies to increase their value is equated by Zucman to a form of tax avoidance, rather than it being seen as investment in the productive sector of the economy with all the benefits that accrue. This seems to me to be a peculiarly European approach, that sees the private sector as acting merely in the service of the state. There is no consideration given to the opportunity cost of deferring income or the risks that investments might fail. Indeed it seems that, whether intended or not, the wealth tax would act at least as a disincentive or perhaps a punishment for saving and investment and an additional reason to avoid risk taking.
Both, a wealth tax and taxes on unrealised capital gains are based on valuations
Equality between taxpayers can only mean tax rates up and not down.
Reductions in government spending are not up for consideration, government spending is ab initio “a good thing” and it is that spending that drives economic progress. This despite the mass of evidence that such thinking has failed.
There is an obsession with equalising tax rates and not considering contributions.
Competitive, efficient, low-cost states must be prohibited from attracting capital from noncompetitive, bloated states on the basis that the latter have some proprietary right to their tax base/taxpayers.
According to Zucman the wealth tax will raise about $390 billion a year. If one - incorrectly - assumes that this were distributed equally across say the G20 nations this would equate to less than $20 billion a year, in the UK’s case one-fifth of its yearly debt interest payments. Of course that is not the case with the U.S. and China having the highest concentration of billionaires (about 1400).
All that said it seems to me that absent the Trump administration a global wealth tax would be on the agenda. The OECD seems to me to be suffering from a form of regulatory capture, where special interest groups, in this heavy spending and economically moribund European governments and NGOs, are given priority or favours over the interests of economic growth, particularly over more competitive and perhaps developing nations.
On this last issue I point to one OECD initiative unrelated to taxation that, for is very revealing. In 2002 the OECD published its “Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct”, which:
“…express the shared expectation of the Adherents for responsible business conduct…and provide an authoritative point of reference for…enterprises and for other stakeholders.…”
Under the guidelines MNEs are expected by governments to:
“…Contribute to the development of environmentally responsible and economically efficient public policy…
…Contribute to economic, environmental and social progress with a view to achieving sustainable development…
…Engage in or support, where appropriate, private or multi-stakeholder initiatives and social dialogue on responsible business conduct, while ensuring that these initiatives take due account of their social and economic effects on developing economies and of existing internationally recognized standards…”
These are not merely words, Governments must establish what are called National Points of Contact (NPCs) whose core duty is to advance the effectiveness of the OECD Guidelines, by promoting and raising awareness about the Guidelines’ standards and perhaps most importantly establishing a grievance mechanism among businesses, civil society, and other stakeholders. In other words national governments are obligated to establish a quasi-judicial system to enforce OECD mandates. At present in the UK there about 12 open complaints before the NPC such as:
Group of NGOs complaint to the UK NCP about Standard Chartered Bank.
Group of NGOs complaint to the UK NCP about HSBC Bank.
Group of NGOs complaint to the UK NCP about Drax Group PLC.
The OECD it seems has morphed into a peculiarly anti-democratic institution that reflects a narrow Eurocentric worldview and that wealth taxes fit readily into its institutional mindset, regardless of the economic consequences.